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The pre-election polls for the 2015 UK General Election missed the final result by a considerable 
margin: underestimating the Conservative Party and overestimating Labour. We analyse evidence for 
five theories of why the polls missed using British Election Study data. We find limited evidence for 
systematic vote intention misreporting, late swing, systematically different preferences among “don’t 
knows” or differential turnout of parties’ supporters. By comparing the BES face-to-face probability 
sample and online panel, we show that the online survey’s polling error is primarily caused by under-
sampling non-voters, then weighting respondents to represent the general population. Consequently, 
demographic groups with a low probability of voting are over-weighted within the voter subsample. 
Finally, we show that this mechanism is likely partially responsible for the over-estimate of the 
Liberal Democrats in 2010, showing that this is a longstanding problem with British polls. 
 
Note: This is a draft paper. The results and conclusions may change before publication, as new data 
becomes available and additional analysis is conducted. Comments are welcome.  Contact us at 
jonathan.mellon@nuffield.ox.ac.uk and chris.prosser@manchester.ac.uk 
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The last few years have not been kind to political pollsters across the world. Opinion polls were well 
wide of the mark in the U.S. midterms, the Israeli general election, and the Greek, Scottish and Irish 
referendums. One of the most notable polling misses was the 2015 UK General Election – the worst 
disaster for British pollsters in nearly a quarter of a century. Pre-election polling put Labour and the 
Conservatives in a dead heat (British Polling Council 2015), with neither party likely to win an 
outright majority. Labour was seen by many as having the best chances of forming the next 
government (Fisher and Lewis-Beck 2016). The actual results came as a surprise: the Conservatives 
led Labour by 6.3 percentage points and won enough seats to form an overall majority. The polls’ 
inaccuracy had important consequences for the election campaign, with media focusing on potential 
coalition negotiations and the Conservative campaign focusing heavily on the threat of an 
SNP/Labour coalition (Green, Jennings, and Mellon 2015; Cowley and Kavanagh 2016). Expectations 
of a hung parliament and potential coalition configurations also seem to have influenced people’s vote 
choices (Green, Fieldhouse, and Prosser 2015). 
 
Several competing explanations have been put forward for the large polling errors on May 7th. This 
article examines five plausible explanations of the polling errors, looking at the evidence for each of 
these possible explanations from the British Election Study (BES). 
1 Possible causes of polling errors 
 
The first possible explanation is late swing. The “late swing” hypothesis states that the Conservative 
vote was underestimated because voters changed their minds at the end of the campaign, after 
pollsters finished contacting them. Investigations suggest that late swing made a modest contribution 
to the polling errors in 1992 election (Market Research Society Working Party 1994; Crewe 1992; 
Jowell et al. 1993a) and a larger contribution to the errors in 1970 (Abrams 1970). 
 
The second possible explanation is differential turnout. This explanation states that some parties’ 
supporters are less likely to go to the polls on Election Day than others. A large body of evidence 
shows that voters systematically overstate their likelihood of turning out to vote and over-report 
having voted after the fact (Burden 2000; Karp and Brockington 2005; Holbrook and Krosnick 2010; 
Presser and Traugott 1992; Górecki 2011). Consequently, pollsters must predict which respondents 
will actually go to the polls. At the 2015 British election, pollsters generally expected increased 
turnout, suggesting that their filters included too many respondents in their samples who ultimately 
did not vote. For instance Ipsos MORI reported that they expected a turnout of 72-74%, compared to 
the actual figure of 66.1% (Ipsos MORI 2015).  Miscalibrated turnout models have been identified as 
one of the important reasons behind the under-estimate of the Republican vote share in the 2010 U.S. 
midterm elections (Pew Research Center 2016). If Conservative supporters were more likely to turn 
out to vote at the 2015 election than Labour supporters, this could explain the discrepancy between 
the pre-election polls and the actual result. 
 
The third possible explanation of the polling miss is that respondents who said that they “don’t know” 
who they would vote for chose differently on Election Day than respondents who declared a vote 
intention. This could be either because the “don’t knows” had not yet made up their minds or because 
they were unwilling to reveal their vote choice. Some evidence suggests that differential voting 
among ‘don’t knows’ contributed to the 1992 polling miss, with about 9% more of those saying don’t 
know voting Conservative (27%) than Labour (18%)  (Jowell et al. 1993b). A related idea is the 
‘spiral of silence’ effect, whereby voters who support a party they believe is unpopular are reluctant to 
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share their views. This reluctance could manifest either by respondents refusing to reveal their vote 
intention or by not responding to surveys (Noelle-Neumann 1993). In the British context the spiral of 
silence is said to result in Conservative supporters differentially responding to opinion polls, 
distorting the polls towards Labour and is often suggested as one of the primary causes of the 1992 
polling disaster (Crewe 1992; Turner and Sparrow 1997; Jowell et al. 1993b; Curtice, Sparrow, and 
Turner 1997). More recently the spiral of silence was cited as one of the possible reasons for the over-
estimation of the Liberal Democrats in 2010 (Boon and Curtice 2010). 
The fourth potential explanation is that respondents said one thing to pollsters while intending to do 
something else (Singh 2015). We call this problem “vote intention misreporting”. There is some 
evidence of  this type of misreporting in other elections (Streb et al. 2008) and vote intention 
misreporting is commonly cited as the reason for the 1992 polling miss,1 although the extent to which 
voters were openly lying to the pollsters has been disputed (Crewe 1992; Worcester 1996). One 
possible factor that might contribute to vote intention (or choice) misreporting is priming through 
question order. Some pollsters suggested that question ordering is a possible cause of vote intention 
misreporting , including Labour’s private pollster, James Morris and YouGov president Peter Kellner 
(Pedley 2015; Kellner 2015). In standard YouGov polls, substantial numbers of “inconsistent” 
respondents say they will vote Labour but rate the Conservatives higher on the economy. However 
there are fewer “inconsistent” voters in the BES campaign survey (also conducted by YouGov). 
Kellner suggests this difference may be because the BES asks for a respondent’s vote intention after 
asking about party leaders and issues. This theory hypothesises that some Labour intenders who were 
“inconsistent” during the campaign switched to the Conservatives on Election Day. However, this 
explanation assumes that voters are consistent in their evaluations and vote choice when they actually 
vote. 
 
The fifth potential explanation says that the polls may not have achieved representative samples of the 
electorate. Researchers have long recognised that representative samples are a requirement for reliable 
measurements of public opinion (Wilks 1940). However the reality of low response rates for most 
polls means that pollsters start off with highly unrepresentative samples, and have to apply substantial 
weighting in order to achieve representativeness. Weighting has become increasingly important as 
response rates have declined (Curtin, Presser, and Singer 2005; Keeter et al. 2006) and the use of non-
randomly selected Internet panels has increased (Couper and Miller 2008; Chang and Krosnick 2009). 
However, given that the problem of achieving representative samples is longstanding and there were 
few large changes to most pollsters’ methodology since the previous election, if unrepresentative 
samples are to blame for the polling miss, this raises the question of why the polls failed so badly in 
2015 and not at previous elections.2  
 
                                                     
1 After the 1992 polling miss the writer and Labour party donor Robert Harris wrote: 'I have reached the 
reluctant conclusion that ours is a nation of liars. People lied about their intentions up to the moment of voting, 
and went on lying even as they left the polling stations . . . The cynics were right after all. People may say they 
would prefer better public services, but in the end they will vote for tax cuts. At least some of them had the 
decency to feel too ashamed to admit it.' Quote in Crewe (1992, 489) 
2 This is not to suggest that the polls have been perfect at previous elections. British polls display a regular 
tendency for overestimating the Labour share of the vote and the 2010 election was particularly notable for the 
large estimate of the Liberal Democrat share of the vote. However in terms of the absolute error of the polls and 
the political consequences of misestimating the Conservative-Labour lead, the 2015 polling miss is the worst 
performance for British pollsters since at least the 1992 election.  
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After examining each of these theories we conclude that only one played an important role in 
explaining the Great British polling miss: representative samples. Our analysis shows that polls 
oversample politically engaged voters who turn out to vote at much higher rates than the average 
British person. Although pollsters de facto sample from the electorate (due to the small number of 
non-voters they actually reach), British polls weight their samples to population-level targets. This 
process means that the under-sampling of non-voters and the disengaged leads to the overweighting of 
respondents who share some demographic characteristics with non-voters. In 2015, these 
overweighted respondents were disproportionally Labour supporting, inflating the estimate of the 
Labour vote. Although the problem of representativeness is longstanding, our analysis suggests that in 
the 2010 election these respondents were disproportionally Liberal Democrats. The collapse of 
support for the Liberal Democrats after entering into coalition with the Conservative and the flow of 
support to Labour amongst overweighted respondents brought long standing problems of 
representativeness into the harsh light of day. 
2 The 2015 British Election Study 
 
This article uses two sources of data from the BES to examine what led to the polling errors: the BES 
Internet panel (Fieldhouse et al. 2015b) and the BES face-to-face post-election probability survey 
(Fieldhouse et al. 2015a).3 
 
The 2015 BES Internet panel (BESIP) consists of six waves (at the time of writing) conducted 
between February 2014 and May 2015, with each wave interviewing around 30,000 respondents. The 
most important waves are the pre-election wave (wave 4) conducted between 4th and 30th March 2015; 
the campaign wave (wave 5) conducted as a rolling daily survey across the campaign period between 
31st March and 6th May 2015; and the post-election wave (wave 6) conducted between 8th May and 
28th May 2015. In total 26,112 respondents took all three election waves (a retention rate of 83% 
across waves 4, 5 and 6). Importantly, the BESIP is a non-probability sample (sampled from 
YouGov’s opt-in pool of respondents), so representativeness has to be achieved through demographic 
quotas and weighting. 
 
We also use the BES face-to-face survey: an address-based random probability sample of eligible 
voters living in 600 wards in 300 Parliamentary Constituencies in England, Scotland, and Wales. 
2,987 people completed the face-to-face survey. Fieldwork was conducted by GfK between May 8th 
2015 and September 13th 2015, achieving a 55.9% response rate.4 
 
The BESIP is only one data source and other polls may have separate methodological issues we do 
not address directly here. However, the BESIP is well suited for studying polling errors in several 
ways. It is panel data, which allows us to compare what people intended to do before the election with 
what they did afterwards. It also has a substantial sample size, allowing us to examine issues such as 
weighting in a more disaggregated way by looking at smaller subgroups. There are also many 
variables available to examine different hypotheses around the polling errors, as the BES surveys ask 
a much broader range of questions than typical political polls. The dataset also has continuity with 
BES studies run in previous elections, particularly 2010, so the analysis of the 2015 polls can be 
                                                     
3 Data are available through http://britishelectionstudy.com/ 
4 Using response rate 3 (RR3) (AAPOR 2008).  
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compared with previous elections. Importantly, the BESIP is conducted by YouGov – one of the most 
prolific UK pollsters –meaning that the data is directly relevant to problems with the polls.  
 
The BES face-to-face survey is an address-based random probability sample. Random probability 
samples are a gold standard with which to compare the data collected using other polling methods and 
are particularly useful for addressing questions about sample representativeness. Finally, unlike 
proprietary political polls, the BES surveys are released as open datasets so any analyses in this article 
can be checked and elaborated on by other researchers. 
3 Evidence for polling error explanations 
 
This section outlines the evidence in favour or against each of the above hypotheses. 
 
3.1 Late swing 
 
Figure 1 shows a possible upswing in voters intending to vote Conservative on the last 2 days of the 
campaign wave in the BES data. This data is based on the vote intentions of BES respondents 
interviewed on each day of the election campaign. 
 
 
Figure 1. Vote intention by day in the British Election Study campaign wave. Figures do not filter by turnout 
likelihood and include squeezed responses. 
 
While this data is consistent with late swing, it is not conclusive.  With only around 1,000 respondents 
each day, these estimates have substantial sampling error. In addition, it is possible that supporters of 
one party may be more willing to take the survey on some days (e.g. when their party has a good day 
in the campaign) than others. This effect can exaggerate apparent changes in support for a party 
(Gelman et al. 2016). 
 
When we look at the full sample in the post-election re-contact survey, we find no evidence of a late 
swing. Figure 2 shows the average vote intention in the campaign and post-election waves, finding 
essentially no difference in the average lead for the Conservatives. 
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Figure 2. Average vote intention across the British Election Study campaign wave and post-election wave.  
 
3.2 Differential turnout 
 
Looking at self-reported turnout among respondents who report supporting different parties during the 
campaign shows little evidence of a differential turnout effect for Labour and the Conservatives. 
Those that expressed a party preference during the campaign but said they did not vote when asked 
after the election were slightly Labour leaning during the campaign, with these respondents having a 
1.2% Labour lead over the Conservatives. Eventual non-voters make up only a small proportion of 
party supporters in the campaign (3.7% of Labour supporters and 3.5% of Conservative supporters 
during the campaign said they did not vote in the post-election wave). 
 
However, differential turnout is difficult to detect because the same people who overstate their 
likelihood of voting before an election may also retrospectively misreport their turnout. To check 
whether turnout misreporting affects our analysis of differential turnout, we used the validated-voter 
subset of the BESIP. In total, we checked 2,700 internet panel respondents against the marked 
register. Of these respondents, 2,453 were assigned a good turnout estimate. The remainder had 
insufficient information to confirm whether their absence from the electoral register was due to non-
registration or missing information about the respondent and/or the electoral register. 
 
In total, 86.9% of these respondents report voting in the 2015 election. However, the validation 
exercise suggests that the true figure is likely to be around 76.0%, meaning that around 10.9% of the 
total sample reported voting but appear not to actually have voted. For more details on the data coding 
exercise, the coding decisions, reliability estimates and full tables of differential turnout for all parties 
see appendix B. 
 
As Figure 3 shows, validated turnout rates among respondents who stated they would vote 
Conservative in the campaign wave are 1.3 percentage points higher than the turnout rates for 
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Labour.5 However, this gap is not statistically significant. Since the sample size is relatively small, the 
evidence is consistent with either a small or zero differential turnout effect. In addition, we should 
bear in mind that most pollsters already filter for turnout likelihood (although YouGov are an 
exception6). Given the small effect of differential turnout, it is likely that existing turnout filtering is 
already sufficiently accounting for differential turnout. 
 
 
Figure 3. Validated turnout rates for self-identified voters of each party in pre-election, campaign and post-election 
BESIP waves and post-election face-to-face survey. None of these comparisons show a statistically significant 
difference in Conservative and Labour turnout rates. 
 
We can also examine differential turnout misreporting after the fact by looking at the probability of 
accurate turnout reporting among self-reported voters of different parties in the BES face-to-face 
(shown in the last two groups of Figure 3). Both the face-to-face and panel show a statistically non-
significant lower tendency of self-reported Labour voters to turn out to vote. Even if the difference 
were significant, it would not account for a major part of the polling miss at least in the BES Internet 
panel. There are some indications of differential turnout among the other parties (for instance lower 
turnout among UKIP respondents), but the sample size makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions 
about these differences. In any case, minor-party differences are unlikely to have caused the incorrect 
Conservative-Labour lead in the polls. 
 
3.3 Differential “don't knows”/Spiral of Silence 
 
In the campaign wave sample, 6.7% of people of people said that they “don’t know” who they would 
vote for. In the post-election survey (when we can see how undecided respondents ended up voting), 
we find a small lead for the Conservatives among previously undecided voters: 30% said they voted 
                                                     
5 Note that all comparisons here are shown using unweighted figures, as later sections of this paper indicate that 
there are substantial problems with the standard YouGov weights. The substantive results are not affected by the 
use of weights. 
6 http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/faq-turnout 
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Conservative and 28% said they voted Labour. However, this difference would only contribute around 
0.05 percentage points towards the polling gap. 
 
It is difficult to assess the spiral of silence and differential response to surveys directly as, by 
definition, respondents who are reluctant to reveal their political preferences would not be in the 
survey. We can however use the BESIP to look for indirect evidence of differential survey response. 
If Conservative voters are less likely to respond to opinion polls in general but at least some of them 
respond to a particular survey, we would expect, ceteris paribus, that they would be less likely to 
respond to future surveys. We can examine differential retention by looking at wave-on-wave 
response rates in the BESIP. Figure 4  shows the wave-on-wave retention of wave 1 BESIP 
respondents by their vote intention in wave 1 and their 2010 vote choice (recorded close to the 2010 
election). Indeed Figure 4 shows no evidence supporting the spiral of silence theory and in fact shows 
a slight Conservative bias in survey response rate. 
 
Figure 4. BESIP wave-on-wave retention for respondents who took the first wave of the study by vote choice in wave 
1 (February 2014) and 2010 vote. 
 
3.4 Vote intention misreporting 
 
Vote intention misreporting is difficult to assess because there is no way to externally validate what 
respondents’ actual vote choice is. However, we can look for indirect evidence of vote intention 
misreporting and do so in three ways: testing question ordering effects, examining the geographic 
distribution of polling error, and imputing vote choice for respondents who refuse to answer the vote 
choice question.  
Several pollsters have suggested that there is a question ordering effect, where there is a higher rate of 
vote intention misreporting when vote intention is put before other questions in the survey. The 
BESIP gives some insight into this theory. In the first three waves, the placement of the vote intention 
question was randomized to be either at the start of the survey or at the end after all the other 
questions.7 Figure 5 shows the results of this experiment: we find no significant differences in the 
                                                     
7 The party identification question was separately randomized so that it would appear at the start or end of the 
survey as well in order to test whether there were differences in placing the questions together or apart. 
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proportion of respondents intending to vote for the Conservatives depending on whether the vote 
intention question was placed at the start of end of the survey (the same results hold when looking at 
Labour vote).8 
 
 
Figure 5. Conservative vote share by experimental group (note that the same randomization was maintained across 
waves, so the p values are not independent) P values are calculated using chi squared tests. 
Another possible explanation would be that face-to-face surveys elicit fewer inaccurate vote choice 
responses than Internet panels. This explanation seems extremely unlikely, given that existing 
evidence points to a smaller social desirability effect online (where there is greater anonymity) than in 
person (Kreuter, Presser, and Tourangeau 2008; Dodou and de Winter 2014). 
 
We can also examine the vote intention misreporting theory by considering where there is likely to be 
social pressure on Conservative voters. For example, it seems unlikely that Conservative voters would 
need to be shy in the heavily Conservative Shires but it is more plausible that they would be by shy in 
traditional Labour heartlands such as Sunderland. 
Figure 6 shows that we actually observe the opposite pattern. The deviation between the proportion of 
BESIP respondents in a constituency saying they voted Conservative and the actual proportion of 
voters who voted Conservative is highest in strong Conservative areas, where we would expect the 
least social pressure against voting Conservative. By contrast, the same analysis on the BES face-to-
face data again suggests that the primary problem with 2015 polls is representativeness. There is a 
close geographic match between the level of Conservative voting in the face-to-face survey and the 
actual election results. In other words, there are broadly the right number of Conservatives in the right 
places and the pattern is the opposite of that in the Internet panel. 
                                                     
8 The sample sizes for this experiment are substantial, 30,192, 26,854, and 22,350 respondents, so the 
experiments have more than enough power to detect effects of the size suggested. 
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Figure 6. 2015 Conservative vote share among survey respondents (BESIP and BES face-to-face) and actual results 
according to 2010 Conservative (local polynomial smooth, bandwidth = 0.1). 
We can also look more directly at those respondents who chose not to reveal their vote choice. In the 
BES face-to-face survey 4% of respondents refused to say who they voted for. After the 1992 polling 
disaster, differential party support in post-election surveys amongst those who had refused to reveal a 
party preference in pre-election surveys was suggested to be a contributing factor to the 1992 polling 
miss (Jowell et al. 1993b). The 2015 BES face-to-face survey is a cross-sectional survey so we cannot 
examine pre-election refusals. We can, however, use answers to a set of questions that asks ‘How 
likely is it that you would ever vote for each of the following parties?’ to estimate the likely 
proportions of party support amongst post-election refusals.9 We estimate a conditional logit model of 
vote choice using respondents who revealed their vote choice to estimate the predicted probability of 
voting for each party based on how likely respondents said they were to ever vote for each party, 
controlling for party specific effects using party fixed effects. This simple model fits the data very 
well, correctly predicting 84% of party choices. Table 1 shows the expected proportion of refusals 
voting for each party, estimated by fitting the model to respondents who declined to reveal their vote 
choice. This analysis shows that, on the whole, refusals are spread between parties in a similar 
distribution to those respondents who reveal their vote choice. The expected proportion of refusals 
voting Conservative is actually smaller than the proportion who revealed their vote choice, and the 
difference for the Conservatives is larger than for any other party, suggesting that Conservative voters 
were the least shy in the survey. 
 
 
                                                     
9 The BESIP did not have a “refuse” option in the vote choice question. The only “refusal” option would be for 
the respondent to say they did not know who they would vote for. As we show earlier in the paper there is no 
evidence to suggest that the pre-election “don’t knows” voted in favour of the Conservatives.  
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Party Respondents 
Expected 
proportion 
amongst refusals 
Difference 
Conservative 39.87 34.2 -5.67 
Labour 32.28 31.88 -0.4 
Liberal Democrat 7.53 11.06 3.53 
UKIP 
11.16 13.13 1.97 
Green Party 3.15 5.91 2.76 
Table 1. Estimated percentage of refusals supporting each party in the BES face-to-face survey. 
3.5 Representativeness/weighting 
 
Pollsters try to overcome any deficiencies in their sampling process by weighting respondents to 
known targets. However there are many ways that samples may be unrepresentative of the population 
even after the weighting targets are reached. Section 3.2 suggests that BESIP respondents are more 
politically engaged than the general population (due to their higher rates of turnout). 
 
The most important test of whether polling samples are representative is to compare the results of the 
BESIP (which, like political polls, uses weighting to achieve representativeness), to the BES face-to-
face probability sample. The probability sample received a 56% response rate, making its 
representativeness much less assumption based than Internet panels and low response rate phone 
polls. 
 
 
GB Face-to-face 
 
BESIP 
  Result Post-result Error   Post-result Error 
Conservative 37.67 40.53 2.86 
 
34.76 -2.91 
Labour 31.16 32.75 1.59 
 
34.32 3.16 
Liberal 
Democrat 8.05 7.05 -1.00 
 
9.81 1.76 
SNP 4.85 4.69 -0.16 
 
4.58 -0.27 
Plaid Cymru 0.61 0.48 -0.13 
 
0.54 -0.07 
UKIP 12.88 10.61 -2.27 
 
10.42 -2.46 
Green Party 3.84 3.15 -0.69 
 
4.31 0.47 
BNP 0.01 0.16 0.15 
 
0.07 0.06 
Other 0.95 0.58 -0.37 
 
1.19 0.24 
Total 
  
8.70 
  
11.39 
Con-Lab lead 6.51 7.78 1.27 
 
0.44 6.07 
Table 2. Performance of face-to-face and BESIP post-election surveys compared to GB results. Face-to-face 
weighting is based on NOP-provided weights accounting for region, age and gender and panel weighting uses the 
publicly available YouGov-provided regional weights. 
Table 2 clearly shows that the BESIP has substantial problems measuring vote choice in the post-
election wave. By contrast, we show that the face-to-face survey comes much closer to the correct 
result and has almost exactly the correct Conservative-Labour lead. In fact, unlike the polls, the face-
to-face survey actually has too many Conservative voters. It is worth considering other possible 
explanations for the gap in the result between the face-to-face and BESIP survey. The face-to-face 
survey had a considerably longer field period (129 days in order to maximise response rate) compared 
to the BESIP (conducted over the course of 19 days). It is therefore possible that respondents started 
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mis-recalling their vote choices towards the end of this period. This phenomenon is well documented 
over longer periods (Durand, Deslauriers, and Valois 2015; Weir 1975; Himmelweit, Biberian, and 
Stockdale 1978; Elsas et al. 2013), so could be operating here. Appendix A analyzes this possibility 
and concludes that any trends in vote intention are driven primarily by different fieldwork speed in 
different constituencies. 
 
Given the gap between the face-to-face data and the BESIP, and the lack of alternative explanations 
for it, it seems extremely likely that unrepresentative samples are a leading cause of the polling miss, 
at least in the BESIP. 
3.5.1 How do the Internet and face-to-face samples differ? 
The first difference between the face-to-face survey and the online panel is the level of political 
engagement. Figure 7 shows three examples of this difference: online panellists are much more 
interested in the campaign, more than twice as likely to be party members, and are much more likely 
to report having voted. In fact, 91.2% of the panel reported voting in the 2015 election, compared with 
73.3% of face-to-face respondents. This turnout gap has substantial effects on sample 
representativeness because polling samples in the UK are weighted (and often quota sampled as well) 
to match population characteristics rather than voter characteristics. 
 
Figure 7. Comparisons of political engagement variables between the BESIP and face-to-face surveys. Positive 
(negative) bars indicate that compared to the BES face-to-face, respondents in each of the categories are over (under) 
represented in the BES Internet panel.  
This problem becomes clear when we look at the match between various demographic variables 
across the face-to-face survey and the panel. In five out of six variables examined (see appendix C), 
there is a closer match between the two surveys when looking at the full sample than there is when 
looking at only the voters in each survey. In particular, the party identification distribution in Figure 8 
is similar between the surveys when looking at the full population but greatly underestimates the 
Conservatives when looking only at the voters in each survey. The difference between the full and 
voter only samples for each survey is even more starkly demonstrated by the distribution of age 
groups, shown in Figure 9. The age distributions for the full samples are almost the same, with very 
similar proportions of respondents falling into each age group, but huge differences in the age 
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distribution of the voter samples. For the voter samples, the BESIP greatly under-represents 
respondents over age 56, and over-represents respondents from the youngest two age groups. 
 
In other words, the BESIP appears to be relatively representative of the population (in terms of these 
variables) but the voters in the BESIP are unrepresentative of the voting population. This may explain 
why the some pollsters have observed that unweighted data performs better than weighted data 
(Sanders et al. 2004; Twyman 2008). 
 
Figure 8. Comparison of party identification in face-to-face and BESIP surveys for all respondents and voters. 
Positive (negative) bars indicate that compared to the BES face-to-face, respondents in each of the categories are over 
(under) represented in the BESIP. 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of age groups in face-to-face and BESIP surveys for all respondents and voters. Positive 
(negative) bars indicate that compared to the BES face-to-face, respondents in each of the categories are over (under) 
represented in the BESIP. 
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Another way to demonstrate the effect that standard sampling and weighting techniques have on the 
results is to look only at easily contacted respondents (i.e. the 714 respondents who responded on the 
first contact attempt). If this was the total sample, the response rate would have been around 13.5%. 
This response rate is still somewhat better than phone polls usually achieve, but nowhere near as high 
as the BES face-to-face achieved. 
Table 3 shows the vote choices of respondents who answered on first contact and the full sample. The 
first two columns show the respondents’ raw vote choices, while the second half of the table shows 
what happens when we weight each of the two samples to be representative of the population. An 
initial examination of the unweighted results suggests little difference in the partisan composition of 
people contacted on the first call and respondents contacted after several calls. The Conservative lead 
over Labour is larger in the full sample, but this difference is minor. However, reweighting the first 
contacts to represent the population in terms of region, age, and gender has a major effect on the 
Conservative party’s lead over Labour in the sample. Whereas, the full sample barely changes after 
applying weights (the Conservative lead actually gets closer to the correct figure), the weighted first 
contact sample ends up with a Conservative lead of less than half the unweighted lead. This analysis 
again suggests that weighting unrepresentative samples to population values can have serious negative 
results. 
 
 Unweighted Weighted 
 Only first contacts 
(n=714) 
All contacts 
(n=2955) 
Only first contacts 
(n=714) 
All contacts 
(n=2955) 
Conservative 38.94 39.81 38.89 39.77 
Labour 31.57 32.21 35.22 32.87 
Liberal Democrats 6.62 7.55 4.8 7.17 
SNP 624 4.86 3.79 4.65 
Plaid Cymru 0.38 0.48 0.8 0.49 
UKIP 13.42 11.25 14.11 11.01 
Greens 2.08 3.12 1.78 3.28 
BNP 0.19 0.14 0.21 0.18 
Other 0.57 0.58 0.41 0.59 
Con-Lab lead 7.37 7.6 3.67 6.9 
Table 3. Reported vote choice among BES face-to-face respondents who responded on first contact and the final 
sample showing unweighted and weighted (using only the relevant subsample) results. 
We can look at why this large shift happens by examining turnout across the weighting factors in the 
initial and final samples. We show this comparison for region in Table 4. The results show that self-
reported turnout is higher in the initial sample in every region except for the East Midlands. However, 
the sizes of the differences vary substantially by region. The regions that most understate turnout in 
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the initial sample are Wales, Yorkshire, the North East, Scotland, Wales, and the North West, which 
are also the regions that the Conservatives perform worst in. In other words, voters are most 
incorrectly upweighted in the Conservatives’ worst performing regions, meaning voters in these 
regions are upweighted and take the place in the sample of non-voters in these regions. 
 
Region Turnout Conservative 
vote share 
2015  First contact Final sample Difference 
East Midlands 77.1 82.5 -5.4 43.5 
East of England 72.6 71.2 1.4 49.0 
London 73.1 71.2 1.9 34.9 
West Midlands 72.7 70.3 2.4 41.8 
South East 81.9 77.9 4 51.6 
South West 86.3 81.6 4.7 46.5 
North West 78.4 73.2 5.3 31.2 
Scotland 82.5 77.2 5.3 14.9 
North East 70 63.4 6.6 25.3 
Yorkshire and the Humber 75.7 67.9 7.8 32.6 
Wales 88 67.7 20.3 27.2 
Table 4. Regional differences in turnout between BES face-to-face respondents who responded on first contact and 
the final sample (unweighted) 
There are also differences in self-reported turnout rates for men and women among initial contacts 
and the final sample. Men who were initially contacted report turnout rates 7.6 percentage points 
higher than women. However, the final sample closes this gap to 0.7 percentage points. This gender 
gap also may have affected the results, as women have a considerably larger Conservative-Labour 
lead than men (9.3 percentage points versus 6.5 percentage points). The larger lead among women 
seems to be primarily due to stronger male support for UKIP and the SNP, reducing the male shares 
for Labour and Conservatives. 
The picture is less clear in terms of age groups. The 18-24 age group report lower turnout in initial 
contacts than in subsequent contacts (44.2% versus 50%). However, the 25-39 age group report higher 
turnout (63% versus 57.7%) and the 60+ age group have almost no gap (87.3% versus 86.4%). In a 
linear regression, the relationship between age and turnout increases slightly in the full sample 
compared with the first contact sample. 
Overall, the initially contacted sample would have led to a far worse result than the final sample, after 
weighting, due to the early interviews disproportionately contacting voters, as opposed to non-voters, 
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in more Conservative leaning regions. The sample would also have had too many male voters (who 
showed a smaller Conservative-Labour lead). 
One way to tackle this problem for post-election surveys is to add in an additional weighting factor of 
the expected proportion of non-voters. This adjustment means that non-voting respondents are 
upweighted to 40% of the sample (we use voting age population turnout), while the other weighting 
targets are kept constant. The consequence of including turnout as a weighting factor is that 
respondents from demographics that vote less will be upweighted in the non-voting subsample, and 
respondents from low turnout demographics will be correspondingly downweighted in the voting 
subsample. 
Table 5 demonstrates this adjustment applied to the post-election wave of the BES internet panel. The 
raked with non-voting column shows that the performance of the post-election wave greatly increases, 
with the sum of absolute errors decreasing by 3.2 percentage points and the Conservative lead 
increasing by 2.3 percentage points. The performance of the BESIP increases further once we weight 
party members to the correct proportion of the population. In fact, the performance of the post-
election wave in absolute error terms is better than the face-to-face survey. This adjustment still 
leaves a substantial portion of the Conservative-Labour lead to explain, but is clearly an improvement 
over implicitly assuming that the stated turnout of respondents is accurate. 
We can also look at this problem in the other direction, by applying weights to the face-to-face data 
and seeing whether it can be made to exhibit the same problems as polling data. The Conservative 
lead over Labour in the face-to-face survey falls by more than half when we reweight the face-to-face 
using only the respondents who reported voting. 
 
GB BES Face-to-face Post-election BESIP 
  Result Raked full 
Raked only 
voters Raked 
Raked with 
non-voting 
Raked/non-vote 
party member 
Conservative 37.67 39.95 38.39 34.40 36.13 36.44 
Labour 31.16 33.04 34.96 33.48 32.94 32.75 
Liberal Democrat 8.05 7.18 6.95 9.37 9.17 9.15 
SNP 4.85 4.53 4.38 3.98 4.47 4.34 
Plaid Cymru 0.61 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
UKIP 12.88 10.88 10.69 11.99 11.38 11.48 
Green Party 3.84 3.21 3.37 4.90 4.22 4.13 
BNP 0.01 0.19 0.20 0.08 0.07 0.08 
Other 0.95 0.56 0.56 1.31 1.13 1.14 
              
Sum absolute 
error 0 8.16 9.45 10.28 7.06 6.50 
Con-Lab lead 6.51 7.23 3.43 0.92 3.19 3.70 
Table 5. Face-to-face and panel data weighted to population and electorate. Note that weights are calculated for the 
BESIP post-election wave at the GB level and use separate age and gender targets. Face-to-face results compare 
raking age/gender and region targets on the full sample and voter only samples. The face-to-face weights are not 
exactly the same as those provided by NOP as the weights use the YouGov age bands. 
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4 Why 2015 
Given that the main problem we identified with the polls in 2015 relates to the fundamental issue that 
polls are unrepresentative in terms of political attention, we must ask an important question: why did 
the UK polling industry perform so badly in 2015 rather than in some other election?  
To help answer this question, we look at the initial weights/turnout adjusted weights for Labour, the 
Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats in the post-election wave in Figure 10. As our reweighting 
results suggested, Labour voters are most heavily down-weighted in this adjustment and Conservative 
voters are least down-weighted. This tells us that Labour leaning respondents were most over-
represented as voters in the sample in 2015. 
 
Figure 10. Probability of voting for a party in 2015 by the ratio of the normal and turnout adjusted 2015 weights. 
We can also conduct the same exercise for the 2010 BESIP. Figure 11 shows these results for the 
2010 data. Whereas there is essentially no relationship between down-weighting and Liberal 
Democrat vote in 2015, in 2010 the relationship is strong and positive. Conversely, the relationship 
between Labour vote share and adjustment is much weaker in 2010 than it was in 2015. 
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Figure 11. Probability of voting for a party in 2010 by the ratio of the normal and turnout adjusted 2010 weights 
These results potentially explain the 2010 over-estimation of the Liberal Democrats (Pickup et al. 
2011) Pickup et al. estimate that the 2010 polls over-estimated the Liberal Democrats by around 4.0 
percentage points: a figure not that much lower than the 2015 polling miss. At the time they were 
unable to find a clear explanation for this over-estimate, but concluded that it was highly unlikely to 
be solely the result of a late swing away from the Liberal Democrats. Instead our findings suggest that 
this over-estimate results from polls over-sampling/overweighting voters from low turnout 
demographics and that these voters tend to support the Liberal Democrats. Using the turnout adjusted 
weights in 2010 reduces the Liberal Democrat’s 2010 share by 0.9 percentage points, increases the 
Conservative share by 1.3 percentage points and increases the Labour share by 0.2 percentage points. 
We cannot adjust the 2010 BESIP in exactly the same way as we adjusted the 2015 BESIP because 
the 2010 BESIP does not include questions on party membership. It is therefore possible that the true 
effect of this mechanism is larger in 2010 than we find here. 
Given these findings, we think that the most likely explanation for “why 2015?” is that the over-
weighted respondents did not vote Labour in 2010. Given that the polls also over-estimated the 
Labour share of the vote in 2001 and 2005, it is possible that 2010 is actually the unusual election. 
The surprise surge of support for the Liberal Democrats among low-turnout demographic groups such 
as students may in fact have saved the pollsters from a 2015 polling miss in 2010.  
5 Conclusions 
 
BES data provides substantial evidence indications about what caused the 2015 polling errors. 
The evidence for late swing is limited. While the campaign wave suggests some movement, the post-
election wave doesn’t reflect late swing. Similarly, our analysis suggests that respondents who said 
“don’t know” during the campaign did not systematically shift in a way that changed the result.  
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We also think that vote intention misreporting is unlikely to have caused the polling error. We show 
strong evidence against question ordering affecting respondents’ truthfulness about supporting the 
Conservatives. Additionally, the polling errors show the opposite geographic pattern than we would 
expect if social pressure led respondents to lie about voting for the Conservatives. Finally, refusals in 
the face-to-face support the Conservatives less than the rest of the sample. 
Despite initial circumstantial evidence that differential turnout contributed to the polling miss, the 
validated vote data provides little evidence that differential turnout was a major cause of the polling 
miss. Our analysis shows that the validated turnout of respondents who supported different parties 
during the campaign is almost the same, with only a small and non-significant difference between the 
turnout of Labour and Conservative supporters. 
By contrast, sampling and weighting played a substantial role in the polling miss. The face-to-face 
probability sample shows a much more accurate picture than the polling data and does not 
underestimate the Conservative vote share. Our subsequent analysis shows that the higher accuracy of 
the face-to-face compared to polling data is due to pollsters surveying too few non-voters, but still 
treating their samples as if they are population samples. Undersampling non-voters makes the voter 
subsample look too much like the general population (over-representing non-voting demographics). 
There is still more to work out however. Our analysis identifies a likely cause of the miss (weighting 
to population targets without correcting for turnout), but more work is needed on how pollsters can 
correct this problem. Our article suggests one such approach that could be used for post-election 
samples, but more work is needed to determine what corrections pollsters can make in pre-election 
polls. 
Finally, this article’s findings need to be considered by pollsters in the UK and in other countries. 
Weighting to population targets and then removing non-voters is by far the most dominant election 
polling approach, and any pollster that uses it risks the same kind of polling miss that Britain saw in 
2015. Given the increasing number of polling misses throughout the world, we may already be seeing 
the results of this methodological approach. 
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Appendix A- Time trends in face-to-face responses 
 
The tendency for voters to misremember their past vote is well documented (Durand, Deslauriers, and 
Valois 2015; Weir 1975; Himmelweit, Biberian, and Stockdale 1978; van Elsas et al. 2013). One 
particular concern with the British Election Study face to face survey is that because the fieldwork 
period was quite long, those surveyed later on may be more likely to misremember their vote. If this 
misremembering took the form of a drift towards the winner of the election (the bandwagon effect) 
this would inflate the Conservative share of the vote. If this was the case, the apparent 
representativeness of the face to face survey may in fact be down to a different sort of error and so it 
would not be able to tell us much about the causes of the polling miss. 
Figure A1 shows that when examined longitudinally there is an increasing Conservative lead in the 
face-to-face survey as the field work progressed. The blue line plots this lead against the respondents 
in the survey in the order they were surveyed and shows that after about 200 voters (this analysis 
excludes non-voters) were surveyed, the lead moves in a linear fashion from a 4% Labour lead over 
the Conservatives to an almost 8% lead of the Conservatives over Labour. At first glance this 
certainly appears to be problematic for the representativeness of the face-to-face survey. 
However this trend, which appears to be driven by time on first examination, is actually an artefact of 
geography. Even if we had a perfectly representative survey and all respondents could remember their 
votes accurately, if different areas are not sampled simultaneously then the fact that different parties 
have different levels of support in different constituencies may give the appearance of longitudinal 
differences, even when the differences are geographic. The orange line in the graph below illustrates 
this point by showing what the Conservative-Labour lead looks like using the constituency results of 
the respondents, rather than their reported vote, by the order in which they were surveyed. Of course 
the face-to-face survey does not match this line exactly, but it is remarkably close and the longitudinal 
trend for an increasing Conservative lead is very similar in both lines.  
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FIGURE A1.. CONSERVATIVE-LABOUR LEAD IN REPORTED AND CONSTITUENCY RESULTS BY THE ORDER RESPONDENTS WERE 
SAMPLED. 
 
Figure A2 makes the same point using the Conservative and Labour shares of the vote. Although the 
face-to-face survey slightly oversamples Conservative and Labour voters, this is fairly consistent 
across time and does not appear to be a result of any ‘bandwagon’ effect. Simply from knowing the 
distribution of voters in different constituencies we would expect there to be an increasing proportion 
of Conservatives and a decreasing proportion of Labour voters for the order in which the respondents 
were sampled.  
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FIGURE A2.. CONSERVATIVE AND LABOUR VOTE SHARE IN REPORTED AND CONSTITUENCY RESULTS BY THE ORDER 
RESPONDENTS WERE SAMPLED. 
Another way of examining the question of the impact of the long fieldwork period on the 
representativeness of the face-to-face survey is to look at reachability in general rather than at which 
groups are missing in particular. If the face-to-face survey is more representative because it is able to 
reach people who are more difficult to contact (because it repeatedly tried to contact those who it 
could not get hold of rather than issuing a second sample) then this could explain why polls, which are 
necessarily conducted in a much quicker fashion, were less representative. One method of looking at 
this is to compare the results of the face-to-face survey across respondents who answered after 
relatively few attempts, to the results from respondents who only answer after they are contacted 
many times. The theory is that easy to contact respondents most resemble samples that pollsters 
manage to contact (Jowell et al. 1993b). However, the analysis shows that we appear to observe the 
opposite pattern.  
 
We combine the question of longitudinal differences and number of calls and look at both with a 
series of multivariate logistic models. Table A1 shows a logit model (model 1) and a multilevel logit 
model with observations clustered at the constituency level (models 2 and 3) for voting either Labour 
or Conservative. In model 1 the interview time has a statistically significant effect for both parties – 
respondents were less likely to say they voted Labour over time and more likely to say they voted 
Conservative. Moving to the multilevel analysis, simply adding a random intercept for constituency 
(model 2) decreases the effect of time for both parties slightly, and also shows that there is 
considerable variance in voting for each party at the constituency level (as you would expect). When 
the share of the vote that the party received in the constituency (model 3) the effect of time is much 
smaller and no longer statistically significant and the share of the vote accounts for almost all of the 
constituency level variation in the probability of voting for either party. Models 1-3 for the Labour 
shows that the probability of being a Labour voter increases with the number of calls that were needed 
to contact the respondent. Model 1 for the Conservatives shows that voters were less likely to be 
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Conservative the more calls that were needed to contact them, though this effect disappears once 
constituency variation is accounted for.  
 Labour  Conservative 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Number of calls 0.105*** 0.0905*** 0.0614**  -0.0439** -0.0318 -0.0236 
 (0.0231) (0.0283) (0.0250)  (0.0222) (0.0262) (0.0236) 
Interview time -7.50e-11*** -7.27e-11*** -3.29e-11  6.56e-11*** 5.29e-11** 2.20e-11 
 (2.21e-11) (2.78e-11) (2.40e-11)  (2.02e-11) (2.48e-11) (2.18e-11) 
Party vote share 
in constituency 
  0.0508***    0.0477*** 
  (0.00346)    (0.00351) 
Constant 130.3*** 126.1*** 54.98  -115.1*** -92.89** -40.66 
 (38.69) (48.65) (41.93)  (35.40) (43.38) (38.16) 
Constituency 
level variance 
 0.804*** 0.00827   0.577*** 0.00549 
  (0.162) (0.0663)   (0.129) (0.0600) 
N 1934 1934 1934  1934 1934 1934 
TABLE A1. LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERVIEW TIME AND NUMBER OF CALLS ON 
RECALLED LABOUR AND CONSERVATIVE VOTE. 
 
Overall there is no evidence from this analysis that the polls were capturing a group of respondents 
similar to those which would be obtained by a cursory probability sample that did not try to recontact 
respondents. Importantly, there's no great Labour lead among easy to reach voters. Perhaps this is not 
that surprising given that easy to reach voters are quite different across modes. However, this method 
only partially reflects reachability for pollsters. While reachability does not seem to be an important 
predictor in the face-to-face context, there may be a greater reachability bias among Internet samples 
and phone polls.  
 
It is also worth noting is that political attention does not predict the number of calls, suggesting that 
failure to reach is less a function of attention than of difficulty contacting. Then again, we have 
survivor bias here. If non-responders are a mixed group of uninterested and busy, the eventual 
responders will be differentially from the busy group. However, if that was the case, then it would 
suggest that effort towards increasing response rates wouldn't reduce the political interest bias. 
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Appendix B - Validated vote 
The name and address information of face-to-face respondents who had given their permission for 
their information to be linked with the electoral registers was matched against the marked electoral 
registers. Additionally, respondents from the internet panel who happened to live in the same wards 
that were sampled for the face-to-face survey were also matched against the registers.  
Based on this information respondents were coded into five categories: 
1) Voted: The respondents appeared on the electoral register and was marked as having 
voted. 
2) Not voted - registered: The respondent appeared on the electoral register but was not 
marked as having voted. 
3) Not voted - unregistered: The respondent did not appear on the electoral register but 
there was sufficient information to infer that they were not registered to vote, e.g. other 
people were registered to vote at the address or if no one was registered at the address people 
were registered at surrounding addresses. 
4) Insufficient information: We did not have sufficient information in the registered to 
assess whether the respondent was registered and voted, either because we were missing the 
necessary pages from the register or we had not been sent the register. 
5) Ineligible: the respondent was on the electoral register but was marked ineligible to 
vote in the general election. 
  
 
 Face-to-face Panel 
Vote validation status Freq Percent Freq. Percent 
Voted 1,286 54.49 1,863 69 
Not voted-registered 387 16.4 188 6.96 
Not voted-unregistered 300 12.71 402 14.89 
Insufficient information 370 15.68 228 8.44 
Ineligible 17 0.72 19 0.7 
Total 2,360 2,700 
TABLE B1. VALIDATION RESULTS FOR FACE-TO-FACE AND PANEL 
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Missing registers  
Despite the heroic efforts of the Electoral Commission many Local Authorities did not supply their 
marked electoral registers, in all we were missing information from around 15% of the face-to-face 
respondents who agreed to be matched. Unfortunately the areas we are missing areas for a 
disproportionately Conservative (based on the 2015 Election constituency results) which introduces a 
slight Labour bias to the reported vote amongst those who had their vote validated. There is a larger 
Labour bias among the validated respondents from the internet panel. We are still assessing the extent 
to which this is driven by the same problem of missing registers or whether it is due to the clustering 
of panel respondents in our convenience sub-sample of the panel. 
 
Reliability  
Based on multiple coding of a subset of the validated respondents we can assess the reliability of the 
validation process, which is very high. For the original 7 point validation scale (which is reduced to a 
five point scale based on additional variables coding address information matching) the coders gave 
the same outcome 94.8% of the time for the face-to-face survey and 96.4% of the time for the internet 
panel.  
We can also assess the extent to which the validation suffers from false positive rates. It is plausible to 
assume that most of our false positives (people who didn’t vote, but who we validate as actually 
having voted) will report not having voted (as only around 25% of non-voters appear to misstate their 
turnout). Within the group of respondents who report not having voted, 1.5% on the face-to-face are 
validated as actually having voted and 1.95% on the panel validate as actually having voted. Given 
that some of these people may have actually mis-recalled in their self-reported turnout, we feel 
confident that the false positive rate in vote validation is under 2%.  
The false negative rate (those who we code as not having voted but actually did vote) is harder to 
quantify because vote validation is done precisely because we do not fully trust the recall of 
respondents who claim to have voted. Our coders reported very few problems with determining 
whether someone on the register had voted (i.e. the marks were generally not ambiguous). We 
therefore feel confident that there are very few false negatives among those who we confirmed as 
being registered.  
Instead, the major of uncertainty comes from when we have to determine whether someone is not 
registered or if we are merely unable to locate them. There is therefore some possibility of false 
negatives in terms of registration and voting within the group we think are not registered. However, 
for the most part we have erred on coding these cases as “not enough information” rather than not 
registered where there was any ambiguity in the available information. 
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  Pre-election Campaign 
  DNV Voted DNV Voted 
Conservative 
Freq 84 401 83 388 
% 17.32 82.68 17.62 82.38 
Labour 
Freq 133 580 127 559 
% 18.65 81.35 18.51 81.49 
Liberal Democrat 
Freq 30 119 21 83 
% 20.13 79.87 20.19 79.81 
SNP 
Freq 35 254 37 233 
% 12.11 87.89 13.7 86.3 
Plaid Cymru 
Freq 1 12 1 15 
% 7.69 92.31 6.25 93.75 
UKIP 
Freq 52 154 46 167 
% 25.24 74.76 21.6 78.4 
Green Party 
Freq 22 93 26 113 
% 19.13 80.87 18.71 81.29 
Refuse/DK 
Freq 34 113 51 149 
% 23.13 76.87 25.5 74.5 
Total 
Freq 521 1,752 534 1,735 
% 22.92 77.08 23.53 76.47 
TABLE B2 VALIDATED TURNOUT RATES AMONG PRE-ELECTION AND CAMPAIGN WAVE RESPONDENTS TO THE BES INTERNET 
PANEL 
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  Face-to-face Panel 
  DNV Voted DNV Voted 
Conservative 
Freq 57 493 63 443 
% 10.36 89.64 12.45 87.55 
Labour 
Freq 64 405 105 656 
% 13.65 86.35 13.8 86.2 
Liberal Democrat 
Freq 9 100 21 142 
% 8.26 91.74 12.88 87.12 
SNP 
Freq 11 42 37 282 
% 20.75 79.25 11.6 88.4 
Plaid Cymru 
Freq 0 10 1 12 
% 0 100 7.69 92.31 
UKIP 
Freq 22 136 32 176 
% 13.92 86.08 15.38 84.62 
Green Party 
Freq 9 30 16 110 
% 23.08 76.92 12.7 87.3 
Refuse/DK 
Freq 8 40 1 5 
% 16.67 83.33 16.67 83.33 
Total 
Freq 182 1,266 278 1,846 
% 12.57 87.43 13.09 86.91 
TABLE B3. VALIDATED TURNOUT RATES IN FACE-TO-FACE AND PANEL FOR THOSE REPORTING HAVING VOTED FOR EACH 
PARTY AFTER THE ELECTIONS 
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Appendix C - Full comparisons of full sample and voter sample for BES 
face-to-face and online panel surveys  
 
Turnout 
 Face-to-face Panel Dif 
Non-voter 26.6 8.3 18.3 
Voter 73.3 91.2 17.8 
Don't know 0.1 0.6 0.5 
Total error   36.6 
    
Party member 
 Face-to-face Panel Dif 
Member 3.5 8.2 4.7 
Used to be member 4.1 9.2 5.0 
Never member 91.9 80.2 11.7 
Don't know 0.5 2.4 2.0 
Total error   23.4 
    
Campaign interest 
 Face-to-face Panel Dif 
Not at all interested 10.1 3.9 6.2 
Not very interested 18.3 7.1 11.2 
Somewhat interested 35.6 31.7 3.8 
Very interested 36.1 57.3 21.2 
Total error   42.4 
TABLE C1. COMPARISONS OF POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT VARIABLES BETWEEN THE BES INTERNET PANEL AND FACE-TO-FACE 
SURVEYS 
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 Party ID 
 Total sample  Voters only 
 Face-to-face Panel Dif  Face-to-face Panel Dif 
Conservative 30.1 29.5 0.6  35.5 30.9 4.6 
Labour 30.6 30.8 0.2  31.5 31.9 0.4 
Lib Dem 6.0 9.1 3.1  6.4 9.3 2.9 
SNP 3.4 3.2 0.2  3.7 3.4 0.4 
Plaid Cymru 0.5 0.3 0.2  0.5 0.3 0.2 
UKIP 4.4 4.8 0.4  4.7 4.9 0.2 
Green 2.1 2.6 0.5  2.2 2.6 0.4 
BNP 0.0 0.1 0.1  0.0 0.1 0.1 
Other 2.6 0.9 1.7  2.9 0.9 2.0 
None/No 15.6 14.9 0.7  9.5 12.6 3.1 
Don't know 4.7 3.8 0.9  3.1 3.1 0.0 
        
Total error   8.3    14.2 
Con lead -0.5 -1.3 0.7  3.9 -1.0 5.0 
    
 
 
    
 Subjective social class 
 Face-to-face Panel Dif  Face-to-face Panel Dif 
No class 33.6 21.5 12.1  32.6 19.1 13.6 
Middle class 18.0 21.8 3.9  20.9 24.1 3.2 
Working class 44.8 50.3 5.5  43.5 51.2 7.7 
Other class 1.8 1.8 0.0  1.6 2.1 0.5 
Don't know 1.7 4.5 2.8  1.5 3.6 2.1 
Total error   24.3    27.1 
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 Private school 
 Face-to-face Panel Dif  Face-to-face Panel  Dif 
Yes 10.2 15.6 5.5  11.2 15.8 4.6 
No 89.8 84.4 5.5  88.8 84.2 4.6 
Total error   11.0    9.2 
        
 Age 
 Face-to-face Panel Dif  Face-to-face Panel Dif 
18-25 13.2 13.9 0.7  10.1 13.0 2.9 
26-35 17.2 17.3 0.1  14.0 16.3 2.4 
36-45 15.6 15.2 0.4  14.7 15.2 0.5 
46-55 18.2 17.7 0.5  19.0 18.1 0.9 
56-65 14.8 20.8 6.0  17.0 21.5 4.5 
65+ 21.0 15.0 6.0  25.2 15.9 9.4 
Total error   13.7    20.6 
        
 Income 
 Face-to-face Panel Dif  Face-to-face Panel Dif 
<40,000 47.1 53.3 6.3  44.7 53.1 8.4 
40-000-50,000 8.9 8.6 0.3  9.6 8.8 0.8 
50,000-100,000 13.5 11.5 2.0  15.5 12.0 3.5 
100,000+ 4.0 1.9 2.2  5.0 1.9 3.1 
DK/refused 26.6 24.7 1.8  25.2 24.2 1.0 
Total error   12.5    16.8 
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 Working status 
 Face-to-face Panel Dif  Face-to-face Panel Dif 
Full time 45.4 41.5 3.9  45.6 41.6 4.0 
Part time 14.0 14.4 0.4  13.9 14.2 0.3 
Unemployed 2.7 3.6 0.8  1.8 3.4 1.6 
Student 3.8 6.3 2.5  3.0 6.1 3.1 
Out of work (other) 9.8 9.8 0.1  7.0 9.6 2.6 
Retired 24.0 21.7 2.3  28.5 22.7 5.7 
Other 0.3 2.7 2.4  0.3 2.4 2.1 
Total error   12.3    19.5 
TABLE C2. COMPARISONS OF VARIABLES BETWEEN FACE-TO-FACE AND PANEL SURVEYS 
 
 
